What is the problem?
A conflict of interest arises when a person or institution responsible for public decision-making has private, financial or professional interests that could influence, or appear to influence, those decisions. In the UN climate negotiations, this is particularly important because COP decisions shape global climate policy on issues such as fossil fuels, climate finance and the energy transition. As the role of fossil fuel interests within the COP process has grown, concerns have increased over whether the responsibilities of COP presidencies, host governments, sponsors and commercial partners are fully aligned with the objectives of the Paris Agreement. Although the UNFCCC has adopted codes of conduct for conference participants and officials, it still lacks a comprehensive framework for identifying, disclosing and managing conflicts of interest.
Credit: IISD/ENB | Mike Muzurakis.
Examples
| President | Background | |
| COP24 | Michał Kurtyka | Energy policymaker |
| COP25 | Carolina Schmidt | Environment Minister |
| COP26 | Alok Sharma | Cabinet Minister |
| COP27 | Sameh Shoukry | Foreign Minister |
| COP28 | Sultan Al Jaber | CEO of ADNOC (national oil company) |
| COP29 | Mukhtar Babayev | Minister of Ecology and Natural Resources, former Vice President for Ecology at SOCAR |
| COP30 | André Corrêa do Lago | Career climate diplomat, Brazilian foreign ministry since 1982 |
Recent COP conferences illustrate how actual or perceived conflicts of interest can affect confidence in international climate negotiations. Before COP28 opened in Dubai, the appointment of Sultan Al Jaber as President of the conference generated widespread debate because he also served as Chief Executive Officer of the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC), one of the world’s largest oil producers. Civil society organisations, former UN officials and members of the European Parliament questioned whether the head of a national oil company could impartially oversee negotiations on reducing fossil fuel depenence. The debate intensified when leaked briefing documents suggested that meetings linked to the COP Presidency could also be used to discuss commercial oil and gas opportunities with foreign governments. The COP28 Presidency rejected these allegations, but the reports renewed calls for stronger conflict of interest safeguards within the UN climate process.
Concerns continued at COP29 in Azerbaijan. The host country is a major oil and gas producer, and several senior officials involved in organising the conference also held positions within the energy sector. Shortly before the conference, an undercover investigation by Global Witness appeared to show COP29 Chief Executive Officer and Deputy Minister of Energy Elnur Soltanov discussing potential investment opportunities with representatives of a fictitious energy company. Azerbaijani authorities rejected the allegations, but the investigation renewed concerns about the separation between climate diplomacy and commercial fossil fuel interests.
COP30 in Belém marked a notable shift in the profile of the presidency. Unlike his two immediate predecessors, COP30 President André Corrêa do Lago was a career climate diplomat rather than the executive of a national oil company, and the Brazilian presidency framed the summit around transparency and what President Lula called a “COP of truth.” In practice, however, the underlying conflict of interest concerns were not resolved, and in some respects they deepened. Independent analysis identified 1,602 fossil fuel lobbyists accredited to the talks, the largest proportional presence recorded at any COP, outnumbered only by the host delegation. Civil society also raised concerns that representatives of high-emitting industries had been included within the presidency’s own host country delegation, and that the COP30 team had contracted a public relations firm that was simultaneously working for a major oil company investing in new production in Brazil. Despite calls from Transparency International and more than 250 organisations for a binding conflict of interest policy, no such framework was adopted, and the final agreement contained no reference to fossil fuels. COP30 therefore illustrates that changing the individual at the head of a conference, while meaningful, does not by itself address the structural conflicts of interest embedded in the COP process.
These concerns coincided with the continued presence of large numbers of fossil fuel lobbyists at COP conferences. Independent analyses identified approximately 2,456 fossil fuel lobbyists at COP28 and around 1,773 at COP29, and 1,602 at COP30, the largest proportional share of any COP to date, with roughly one in every twenty-five participants linked to the fossil fuel industry, outnumbering the combined delegations of the ten most climate-vulnerable countries.
What should be done?
The COP process requires clear and consistent conflict of interest rules covering COP presidencies, senior officials, negotiators, sponsors and official partners. Relevant financial interests, outside affiliations and lobbying activities should be disclosed, while transparent procedures and independent oversight should ensure that potential conflicts are identified and appropriately managed.
What does Transparency International Türkiye recommend?
Transparency International Türkiye’s COP Integrity Principles recommend a comprehensive conflict of interest framework for all actors involved in COP governance. This includes mandatory declarations of interests for senior officials, integrity due diligence for sponsors and partners, public disclosure of lobbying meetings and financial relationships, and the establishment of an independent COP Integrity Panel to oversee compliance and review complaints.
